It follows that any hypothesis about Nature, which is just to the demands of a sound Metaphysic, must, like ours, conceive the natural world as directly bound up with the experiences of actually conscious beings.
To order it. These other generalizations are often perfectly literal statements of how the facts of Nature are known to behave.
The poets, too, sing of precisely the principle that the students of energy report to us, namely, of this very irreversibility of certain processes of nature. The Monads are souls. The science of the future may come to observe phenomena which will explain gravitation as a mere appearance of some much more genuine natural process.
The question as to how deep into the truth of Nature our empirical science goes is then the question: How far do the laws of Nature that science makes out agree with any natural truth that is valid wholly beyond the range of the human point of view, and that can be said to hold more or less apart from our mere human appearances?
That is, they have said: Matter is very probably, in the main, what we take it to be, viz. Nobody can doubt that they are ideal constructions.Nature is neutral and blind; she makes no distinction between saints and sinners, and destroys both fools and philosophers. Follow me on Twitter. That theory implies an essentially realistic conception of Being, and falls with Realism. We are by this time well aware that no empirical science pretends really to know what the inner nature of things is at all, and least of all, to know the ultimate nature of Matter. Taken in itself, a Monad is an ultimate fact of Being, whose nature needs not the real nature of any other Monad to explain it, and whose essential independence of all that is external to itself is the first and the central fact about its form of Being. And, as a consequence, Berkeley's hypothesis reduces Matter to an appearance having no basis except 1 the experiences and ideas of men; and 2 the direct influence of the power and providence of God upon these human experiences and ideas. Meanwhile, our hypothesis supposes that, in case of the animals, we may well be dealing not with beings who are rational in our own time-span, nor yet with beings who are irrational. We confuse the event with its after-effects. In what sense such a change could still preserve in fact our individuality, is a problem that this lecture still leaves open for later consideration. I suppose that this play between the irrevocable and the repeated, between habit and novelty, between rhythm and the destruction of rhythm, is everywhere in Nature, as it is in us, something significant, something of interest, something that means a struggle for ideals. In our lecture on Time and Eternity we considered such relations in their more general forms.